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Summary findings
Liberalization in commodity markets has brought  *  Creating an appropriate  legal, regulatory, and
profound changes in the way price risks are allocated and  institutional framework.
managed in commodity subsectors. Price risks are  *  Reducing government intervention that crowds out
increasingly allocated to private traders and farmers  private sector involvement.
rather than absorbed by the government.  *  Providing training and raising awareness.
The success of market reform depends on the ability of  *  Improving creditworthiness and reducing
the emerging private sector to make full use of the  performance risk.
available range of modern commodity marketing, price  The use of commodity derivative instruments to hedge
risk management (such as futures, options, swaps,  commodity price risk is not new among developing
commodity bonds, and so on), and financing  countries. The private sector in many Asian and Latin
instruments.  American countries, for example, have been using
Because farmers do not generally have direct access to  commodity futures and options for some time. More
these instruments, interinediaries must be developed.  recently, commodity derivative instruments are being
Larger private traders and banks are in the best position  used increasingly in several African countries and many
to become these intermediaries.  economies in transition. And several developing and
Preconditions needed for accessing modern  transition economies have sought to establish commodity
commodity marketing, price risk management, and  derivative exchanges.
financing instruments are:
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Many developing countries and transition economies rely heavily on exports of
primary commodities for income and export revenues, which exposes both governments
and the private sector in these countries to the uncertainty associated with commodity
price movements. Government revenues can be dependent on commodity prices either
directly, through export taxes or import duties or indirectly, through income and
expenditure taxes. Price support programs also expose governments to commodity price
risks, since governments generally absorb the cost of falling prices. Likewise, in the
private sector, commodity traders' profits are uncertain because of price variability; and
farmers' decisions to plant, harvest, and invest also depend largely on the outcome of
future prices.
There are three classes of instruments to deal with commodity price uncertainty:
instruments aimed at making the commodity price distribution less variable; instruments
that make commodity prices, and possibly commodity-related revenues, more
predictable; and instruments that keep expenditures in line with income flows.
Government price support programs and international commodity agreements (ICA) are
examples of tools used to reduce price variability. Commodity derivative markets such as
futures, options, swaps, and commodity-linked notes are tools for hedging, to make
revenues more predictable. Finally, compensatory financing schemes, such as the IMF
Contingency Compensatory Finance Facility and EU's Stabex scheme, as well as credit
markets and savings decisions, tend to smooth consumption expenditures.
Making Price Distribution Less Variable
In general, ICAs and government support programs (commodity stabilization
funds, buffer stocks, etc.) attempt to make the distribution of commodity prices less
variable. In most cases the intervention also tries to raise the mean price distribution
above market levels. However, such interventions tend to be inflexible, leading to a
misallocation of resources. They also have by and large been costly and not very
effective. Prices are subject to long and unpredictable swings, requiring large resources to
support them. This carries a high financial cost in terms of foregone opportunities, with
most of the costs borne by farmers and government treasuries.
There are no ICAs currently in force, and when they were, their efficacy was
questionable. Their unsatisfactory performance had to do with conflicting interests
between producing and consuming members, inadequate financial resources, failure to
account for changes in production and consumption patterns, and failure to adjust
unrealistic price goals in the face of persistent price declines during the 1980s and into
the 1990s.
1Smoothing Income Flows
Compensatory financing schemes have the objective of providing resources to
compensate for short-term declines in commodity-related revenues. However, by their
very nature, they tend to react to ex-post developments in commodity markets rather than
provide an instrument for ex-ante price risk management. They are also subject to
conditionality.
Making Prices and Revenues More Predictable
Commodity derivative instruments have several advantages over government
intervention in dealing with commodity price uncertainty: (i) they rely on market-
determined prices instead of administratively-determined prices; (ii) they shift risk to
entities better able and willing to assume risks; (iii) they can be linked to financing
instruments, in some cases making financing feasible at lower cost; and (iv) in most
cases, they cost less than government price intervention programs.
Commodity derivative instruments can be combined with traditional financial
tools to enhance financing. This is especially important for recently liberalized
commodity subsectors, where the quick establishment of credit flows is crucial to the
success of reform. There are many ways to link hedging and traditional financial tools.
For example, an exporter and a buyer may agree on a fixed price for a certain volume of a
commodity. The buyer then provides a line of credit to the exporter, which is drawn down
as exports are made. In turn, the buyer sells the commodity for future delivery or hedges
the price risk on the option market. Commodity-related projects can also benefit from
using commodity derivatives along with financing tools. For example, the repayment of a
loan to a copper producer can be linked to copper prices; if prices fall (increase) the
producer pays less (more) interest.
It should be noted, however, that commodity derivative instruments do not have
exactly the same objectives as government price support programs and ICAs. Commodity
derivative instruments are designed to reduce commodity price and revenue uncertainty.
They can also provide some price stability, but for relatively short periods of time
(usually less than a year). Such investments are not usually effective in stabilizing prices
for longer periods, and they cannot maintain higher (for sellers) or lower (for buyers) than
market prices.
Commodity derivative instruments are not new in developing countries and
transition economies. Private sector exporters and traders in several commodity-
dependent countries such as Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Indonesia, and
Malaysia have been using commodity futures and options to hedge their price exposure.
Certain government companies (parastatals), mainly in metals and energy, have also been
using commodity derivatives markets; among them are Codelco (copper in Chile), PMI
(oil in Mexico), Petrobras (oil in Brazil), Petroecuador (oil in Ecuador), and Mexicana de
Cobre (copper in Mexico). In addition, governments have recently started using
2commodity derivatives as an alternative to their commodity intervention programs.
Among these are the USDA options pilot program, the Canadian cattle options pilot
projects and Mexico's price support program for cotton and grains. Reforms aimed at
liberalizing agricultural markets, reducing government interventions, and removing
capital, foreign exchange and legal controls and barriers are inducing the private sector
and governments alike to hedge their price risks.
As a result of the increasing popularity of commodity derivative markets several
developing countries and transition economies have expressed an interest in setting up
their own commodity exchanges in order to provide local users with better access to
contract exchanges, to ensure that contract specifications are appropriate for locally
traded commodities, to introduce new contracts of local interest, and to remove the
exchange rate risk of using foreign exchanges. These benefits, however, have to be
weighted against the benefits of using existing exchanges with well-established rules and
regulations, have the confidence of their customers and a high volume of transactions
(liquidity), enabling users to easily find a buyer or seller. There are several preconditions
for establishing new futures and options exchanges in developing countries and transition
economies, the most important being a well- established cash (spot) market. Others
include appropriate infrastructure, a developed financial sector, an appropriate legal and
regulatory framework, sufficient capital to form a viable clearinghouse, and the support
and interest of the local business community in using the exchange. Several developing
countries and transition economies, including Argentina, Brazil, China, Hungary, India,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Russia, and Zimbabwe have already established futures and
options exchanges.
Whether establishing their own or using existing commodity derivative markets,
developing countries and transition economies need to overcome certain barriers to using
these markets:
*  Legal and regulatory barriers. Some countries have exchange controls and/or
regulations that prohibit the purchase and sale of commodity derivative instruments.
*  Policy barriers and government  intervention. Government policies that distort
commodity markets crowd out private sector incentives for managing commodity
price risks.
*  Know-how. The use of commodity derivative markets requires considerable
knowledge and the existence of an appropriate institutional framework within which
to carry out hedging operations. Hedging requires special attention from the user of
commodity derivatives, it requires personnel to follow the positions in commodity
markets as well as a system of controls to avoid abuses.
*  Awareness.  Policymakers, decisionmakers, CEOs, board of directors, etc., need to
have an adequate general understanding of market techniques and instruments.
*  Basis risk and liquidity. In commodity derivative markets there are not always exact
hedging instruments available for every commodity. The length of time and volume
of transactions that can be hedged is also constrained. Derivative instruments
3(forward contracts, options, swaps, etc.) traded in the over-the-counter (OTC) could,
in certain cases, provide a more exact hedging instrument, since OTC instruments can
be customized. However, even OTC instruments have limitations with regard to the
hedging time and the volume of transactions they can cover. Exceeding these limits
can prove very costly for the user of such instruments.
*  Creditworthiness. The use of commodity derivative instruments, particularly
contracts, swaps, commodity bonds and commodity-linked loans, usually requires a
high credit rating. This is particularly true for forward contracts, swaps, commodity
bonds and commodity-linked loans. Countries can overcome the creditworthiness
constraints by improving collateralization and insurability through clarification of
collateral law and property rights, central bank regulations for using foreign exchange
to hedge transactions, use of offshore accounts, and the creation of secure collateral in
the form of warehouse receipts backed by appropriate monitoring, licensing, and
bonding systems with international standards.
*  Premiums  and cash flows.  The use of futures requires the deposit of margins, and the
purchase of options requires the payment of a premium. Other commodity derivative
instruments also require the use of capital for purchasing that instrument or for using
collateral to cover performance risk. Both governments and firms need to have
resources available to meet these needs.
41. Why Deal with Price Uncertainty?
It is clear that better management of commodity price risk could benefit the great
majority of developing countries, which continue to have large commodity price
exposures on both exports and imports. Exports are often concentrated in a few primary
commodities with positively correlated price movements. For 36 developing countries,
the share of primary commodities to total exports exceeded 50 percent during the early
1990s. In several, a single commodity accounts for more than 80 percent of total export
earnings; for example, coffee in Burundi, Burkina Faso and Uganda, and oil in Nigeria,
Venezuela and Iran. Overall, primary commodities accounted for 68 percent of exports of
low-income developing countries and 44 percent of high-income developing countries.
Although the dependency of developing countries on primary commodities exports has
declined during the past 20-30 years, it is still quite high. Imports are also influenced by
commodity prices, particularly those of fuels and food. Oil and food grains account for a
large share of the import bill for a large number of developing countries, particularly the
low-income group. Given the crucial role of oil and food grains in these countries, the
issue of managing commodity price uncertainty becomes critical.
The dependency on few commodities and uncertain commodity prices expose
both the government and the private sector in these countries to uncertain revenues and
expenditures, which makes planning difficult. For example, in Venezuela, where oil-
related revenues accounted for 78.5 percent of total government revenues in 1991, 10
percent change in oil prices meant a 6 percent change in total government revenues. The
servicing of a country's debt is also crucially dependent on commodity prices. For
example, in Indonesia, the ratio of debt service to exports rose from 8.2 percent in 1981
to 27.8 percent in 1987, due mainly to the dollar depreciation after 1985 and the fall in oil
prices after 1986.
Private exporters and traders, often operating under tight margins, can also face
significant difficulties when commodity prices change. For example, an exporter or trader
that has purchased coffee from a local producer and has not yet sold it faces enormous
risk if coffee prices collapse. In the absence of ways to manage price uncertainty, traders
require large margins to avoid these negative consequences. Uncertainty in commodity
prices also has negative implications for commodity financing; banks and other lending
institutions are reluctant to finance commodity trade or commodity-related projects
because the repayment of loans often depends on future commodity prices. A fall in
commodity prices may affect the borrower's ability to repay the loan, and in any case, the
cost of lending may be high.
52. Categories of Instruments  to Manage Price Uncertainty
The most common approaches used by developing countries' to manage
commodity price risk include domestic and international commodity price stabilization
schemes, reserve management and contingent finance. Domestic commodity price
stabilization schemes most often involve the creation of a buffer stock that purchases
commodities when prices fall below a certain threshold and sells when prices recover.
Another instrument is a stabilization fund that compensates producers when prices fall
and accumulates reserves when prices increase (example, Caisse de Stabilization in Cote
d'Ivoire). Commodity stabilization schemes often impose a high cost on the economy in
terms of funds required; and they often prove ineffective when most needed. In
developing countries in particular, domestic price stabilization has not been satisfactory,
with the vast majority of such funds being used for social objectives unrelated to price
stabilization, experiencing severe liquidity problems, and/or being subject to
mismanagement and corruption. But if they were to be used for their stated objectives,
commodity stabilization schemes would still not be effective because of the way
commodity prices typically behave.
Recent empirical work on commodity prices (Deaton 1992) shows that most
commodity prices do revert eventually to their mean-a  requirement for a stabilization
fund (or a buffer stock scheme) to be viable-but  only very slowly, with an average
reversal time measured in years, not months. Because of this, a commodity stabilization
fund has to be very large to be effective or the country needs to have ample access to
foreign borrowing. But a large fund is not feasible for domestic political reasons-it  is
too much subject to spending pressures from domestic constituencies-and  sovereign risk
generally prohibits the necessary access to foreign borrowing. And because a small fund
is not effective, there is little scope for countries to stabilize domestic commodity prices
through foreign borrowing when the fund's resources run out. Furthermore, funds tie up
scarce resources that could be better used in other sectors of the economy. An additional
problem with domestic price stabilization schemes is that they redistribute the risks
within the country (usually from producers to the government) rather than diversify them
outside the country to entities better able to bear such risks.
A significant part of the cost of price stabilization in agricultural commodities has
been borne by the farmers. Farmers in commodity stabilization systems usually receive a
low percentage of the FOB price compared to farmers in free market systems. For
example, cocoa farmers in Cote d'lvoire and Ghana receive less than 50 percent of the
FOB price compared to cocoa farmers in Nigeria, Indonesia and Malaysia, who receive
over 80 percent.
Given the problems associated with stabilization funds and other traditional
instruments, many countries that once relied on these instruments for their export crops
have been abandoning them. Nigeria did away with stabilization in the cocoa sector in
1986; Madagascar, Burundi and Uganda did so in the coffee sector in 1989, 1990, and
1992, respectively, and Cameroon did so for coffee and cocoa in 1994. Stabilization
6funds that have had some success are the coffee fund in Colombia (although the decline
of coffee prices after 1989 created serious financial problems for the fund), the Copper
Stabilization Fund in Chile, and the Mineral Resource Stabilization Fund in PNG (where,
the prolonged decline in commodities in the 1  980s also caused significant financial
problems). In general, however, government intervention to stabilize commodity prices
and reduce uncertainty has often proven ineffective and costly. The stabilization funds in
Chile and PNG were to stabilize commodity related revenues instead of prices.
On a microeconomic level, firms frequently allocate an amount of capital as a
buffer against lower-than-expected revenues or higher-than-expected costs. This capital
may come from cash reserves, sale of liquid assets, issues of debt or equity, deferral of
capital investment, or cutbacks elsewhere in the firm. This allocation of capital insurance
against risks is similar to the use of a stabilization fund at the macroeconomic level. In
both cases, governments and private or public firms allocate capital as a form of
insurance. The cost of this insurance is the foregone income that the capital could earn if
applied to its most productive use. If capital is dedicated as a safety cushion instead of
invested, it saves the firm or the government the cost of hedging, but costs it the foregone
investment return. Self-insurance is free only if there is no better use for the capital.
International commodity stabilization schemes are agreements aiming at raising
and stabilizing commodity prices. The main instruments employed by these agreements
are stocks and export quotas. Commodity agreements in the late 1970s and 1980s
included the International Coffee Agreement, which used an export quota system, and the
International Cocoa Agreement and the International Rubber Agreement, which used
buffer stocks. Currently, no agreements remain with price stabilization components.
These agreements ran into difficulties because they tried to maintain not only stable but
also high prices, because of disagreements among members, and because of lack of
discipline.
Compensatory financing schemes can perform a useful role by providing funds
after a price decline. However, by their very nature they are designed to provide financial
assistance for the adjustment to external commodity price or volume shocks, rather than
provide a tool for ex ante price risk management.
The limited success of this instrument in managing commodity price uncertainty
has created the need for other alternatives such as commodity derivatives. These include
standardized instruments used in established commodity exchanges (futures and options)
and over-the-counter (OTC) alternatives (forward contracts, OTC options, swaps, etc.).
The main advantage of the exchange-traded instruments are the low cost of executing
transactions, liquidity, and also standardized requirements regarding quality, quantity,
delivery dates, etc. OTC instruments are customized to the specific transaction and could
reduce the administrative burden of executing transactions for the final user. Annex I
describes the main characteristics of various commodity derivative instruments.
7There are three main reasons to intervene in commodity markets; to make the
price distribution less variable; to make commodity prices and/or revenues more
predictable, given a price distribution; and, to smooth expenditures, given income flows.
International commodity agreements and government policies (stabilization funds, buffer
stocks, etc.) aim at the first objective. However, as discussed earlier, in most cases fixing
commodity prices for an extended period of time has proven costly and ineffective and
not necessarily desirable from an economic point of view, since it impedes the allocation
of resources to more dynamic sectors. Commodity derivative instruments aim at the
second objective; rather than stabilize prices or revenues they remove price uncertainty
from commercial transactions and commodity-related lending, and thereby reduce
uncertainty in revenues. For example, using a swap, a mining company can lock in (fix)
the price for its copper exports for a period, of say, up to three years. Derivative
instruments can also provide price protection for farmers, assuring them of a minimum
price for their crop within a given year. The question. however, is for how long and to
what degree quantities prices can be stabilized: price coverage can generally last for
longer periods in the cases of metals and energy; in energy markets, for example,
coverage for certain size transactions can be extended for up to ten years. For agricultural
commodities, coverage is usually restricted to a few months because of production
uncertainty. Finally, the third objective, smoothing expenditures given income flows, is
dealt with merely through credit markets and saving decisions. But also, revenue
stabilization funds (e.g. Chile) could be used to stabilize government spending.
Commodity derivative instruments will not prevent or reverse a persistent
deterioration in commodity prices, such as occurred after the mid 1  980s, or sudden spikes
in prices in oil or, more recently, in grains, but they can mitigate the short-term effects of
adverse price movements; that is, smooth out short-term price fluctuations. In this sense,
commodity derivatives can help governments and the private sector to gradually adjust to
new trends in commodity prices. To deal with unfavorable longer-term price trends,
developing countries need to improve productivity and continue the process of
diversification.
83. The Rise and Fall of Cooperative Strategies
Large market share and low price elasticities not only create an adding-up
problem but also entice producers to collectively control supplies and influence prices,
particularly where production is concentrated in the hands of a few decisionmakers.
Examples include the nineteenth century copper cartel operated by the French Society
Industrielle et Commerciale des Metaux and the modern De Beers diarnond cartel.
Beginning in the 1950s, many governments of commodity-producing countries
took on the task of managing commodity markets through international agreements.
Under United Nations auspices five international commodity agreements were signed by
producing and consuming countries: the International Sugar Agreement (1954), Tin
Agreement (1954), Coffee Agreement (1962), Cocoa Agreement (1972), and Natural
Rubber Agreement (1980). These agreements, however, were unable to adapt to changes
in the market, and by 1996 the economic clauses in them had all lapsed or failed (Gilbert
1987 and 1995), victims of politics and economics (table 1).
Four important lessons can be drawn from theory and history:
*  Using the example of a common export tax, Akiyama and Larson (1994)
demonstrate that the benefits to producers are not distributed equally among
countries that coordinate their policies. Major producers have often benefited
from not joining a commodity agreement. Brazil stayed out of the Tin Agreement,
Cote d'Ivoire out of the Third Cocoa Agreement, and Vietnam out of the Coffee
Agreement.
3  Under several agreements (tin, cocoa, rubber) buffer stock operations were used to
influence world prices. Williams and Wright (1991) and Larson and Coleman
(1993) show that even random commodity price movements will eventually
bankrupt such schemes. Such was the case when the Tin Agreement failed in
spectacular fashion in 1985, nearly bringing the London Metals Exchange down
with it.
*  The agreements are shaped to existing market conditions and so are not
sufficiently adaptable to changing markets in a dynamic world. The economic
provisions of the Second Sugar Agreement were first suspended in 1962 when
Cuba, having lost access to the protected U.S. market, sought a substantial
increase in its quota, which the other producers refused to grant (Gilbert 1987).
The Third International Cocoa Agreement, negotiated during a period of
historically high prices, sought to defend unsustainable price levels.
*  The very success of agreements to raise international prices often leads to their
eventual demise. Governments negotiate the agreements, but farmers frequently
decide how much to produce and how much to invest. Responding to higher
9prices, farmers  in Brazil, Cote  d'Ivoire, Indonesia  and Malaysia  planted  new areas
to cocoa during  the Cocoa Agreement,  swamping  an underfinanced  buffer  stock
operation.  Similarly,  coffee  production  expanded  dramatically  in Colombia  and
Vietnam  during the Coffee  Agreement,  leading  to large inventories  of unmarketed
coffee.
Table 1. Historically, International Commodity Agreements Have Proven
Unsustainable
Sugar  Tin  Coffee  Cocoa  Rubber
Initial agreement date  1954  1954  1962  1972  1980
Status of economic clauses  lapsed  collapsed  suspended  suspended  suspended
in 1963 and  1983  in 1985  in 1989  in 1988  in 1996
Number of agreements  4  6  4  4  3
Source: Gilbert  1995,  and  World  Bank.
104. Experience of Developing Countries in Using Commodity Derivative Tools
The use of commodity derivative markets by developing countries is not new.
Coffee and cocoa traders in some developing countries have used futures and options
contracts for the past 10-15 years to hedge their exposure to commodity price risks.
Although, as table 2 shows, in 1991 the open interest in US commodity exchanges
attributed to developing countries was still very small as a percent of the total open
interest, there is a growing acceptance of swaps, options and futures as tools to manage
risk and to tap new sources of finance. Among developing countries, the largest share
using US futures exchanges is attributed to Latin American countries, possibly due to
geographic proximity, destination of trade, and similar trading hours. Similar statistics
could not be obtained for exchanges in Europe and Asia. Among commodities, most of
the activity of developing countries has been concentrated in foodstuff (mainly coffee and
cocoa), metals and energy.
Table  2. Percentage of Reportable Developing Country Open Interest Over Total
Open Interest in US Futures Exchanges for Selected Commodities, 1991
Commodity  Group  Asia Developing  Middle  East and  Sub-Saharan  Latin
North  Africa  Africa  America
Grain  and soybean  complex  0.19  0.12  1.21
Livestock  products  - - 0.39
Foodstuffs  0.30  0.18  0.68  2.09
Industrial  material  0.14  0.03  1.58
Metals  0.07  0.90  - 1.19
Crude  oil*  - - 1.40
Financial  instruments  0.01  0.20  - 2.04
Currencies  - 0.27  - 3.17
Note: The data were compiled  from CFTC  "01" report  forms, which are filed daily by futures  commission
merchants,  clearing  members,  and foreign  brokers.  (-) signifies  values less  than 0.05.
*Total  for all developing  countries  is 1.6  percent.
Source:  Summary  of data presented  in Debatisse  and others,  1993
The use of derivative instruments by developing countries has recently been
increasing. For example, in energy derivative markets, the open interest of developing
countries in crude oil futures contracts on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX)
was 1.6 percent in 1993. During the first quarter of 1994, developing countries accounted
for about 3.5 percent of the total open interest in such contracts, with the largest increase
registered by Latin America. The International Petroleum Exchange (IPE) in London has
also reported a significant increase in the open interest attributed to countries in the FSU
and Latin America.
The increasing use of derivative instruments to deal with commodity price
uncertainty by developing countries is due mainly to:
I *  The wave of deregulation and privatization in developing countries, which is making
governments and the private sector more responsive to market forces. Governments,
rather than providing price protection by absorbing price risks, are increasingly
allowing price risks to be incurred and managed by private entities (traders and
producers). Certain governments are also considering, and some have used,
commodity derivative markets to protect their exposure to price risks when they offer
price protection to producers.
*  Cuts in farm subsidies and price supports schemes as a result of the Uruguay Round,
which have increased uncertainty in agricultural markets. Producers are now
increasingly eager to hedge risks.
*  Increasing awareness and knowhow regarding derivative instruments among
policymakers and the private sector. The proliferation of financial instruments and
rapidly growing stock markets has spillover effects on commodity markets.
*  The removal of legal barriers and controls, such as foreign exchange and capital
controls, so that risk management instruments can be used by the private sector and
governments.
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125. Advantages of Using Commodity Derivative Markets
Commodity derivative markets have several advantages over price stabilization schemes:
*  They reduce the uncertainty regardingfuture  revenues (or expenditures).
Derivative markets increase the probability that anticipated future revenues (or
expenditures) will be realized. They enable producers to lock in a price that will cover
their costs or minimize their losses if market prices are low and enable private traders
to lock in profit margins. Importers can remove uncertainty related to future import
prices and users of raw materials can lock in their commodity-related costs. This
ability to lock in margins leads to a reduced commercialization margins. In the
absence of such instruments, traders would require higher margins to cover
themselves from adverse commodity prices movements that could eliminate their
profits.
*  They rely on market prices rathler  thian  administrative prices. Derivative instruments
expose market participants to market prices and to market expectations of future
prices, and thus reduce the need for governments to use subjective price forecasts to
set prices and reduce. The reliance on market prices has implications for resource
allocation; resources will flow to sectors where market prices are expected to be more
favorable.
v  Thtey  shift the risk outside the country. Commodity derivative instruments shift the
risk from developing countries to consumers, producers, traders or speculators in
industrialized countries, who are better able and/or willing to take the price risk
because they have the opposite exposure. These instruments can therefore be used as
insurance at low cost.
*  They can reduce the cost of commodity financing.  Financing commodity trade and
commodity-related projects in developing countries exposes the lender to price risks,
since the borrower's ability to repay the loan largely depends on future commodity
prices. Commodity derivative instruments can be used to lock in future revenues and
assure the lender that these revenues will cover repayment of the loan. Thus, they can
increase the creditworthiness of the borrower. Loans for commodity-related projects
can  be  structured  in  such  a  way  that  repayment  of  the  loan is  linked  to  future
commodity prices; i.e. when commodity prices drop the borrower pays less and when
prices increase the borrower pays more, but can afford to do so because revenues have
also  increased.  This  matching  of  revenues  with  debt  obligations  improves  the
borrower's  ability to service the debt. Commodity loans that have combined lending
with commodity derivative instruments include Sonatrach (the state oil company in
Algeria;  box  2).  Mexicana  de  Cobre  (a  Mexican  copper  producer),  EBRD's
aluminum-linked loan to Slovalco, AS..(an aluminum producer in Slovakia; box 3)
and the PTA Bank in Kenya, which finances coffee exporters.
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The private sector uses derivative markets to protect profits  and secure
financing.  One consequence of agricultural market liberalization is the shift of part or all
of commodity price risks from the government to the private sector. Where governments
prior to liberalization offered price protection, after liberalization they are passing more
of the price uncertainty to local private traders, processors and producers, who need to
use instruments that will enable them to protect their profit margins against commodity
price fluctuations. In the absence of such instruments, the margins required will be higher
to cover the possibility of adverse price movements, and even with higher margins some
traders and processors could still go bankrupt if commodity prices move abruptly.
Producers need protection against price uncertainty because their planting and harvesting
decisions depend on future prices; securing these prices enables them to make appropriate
decisions about allocation of resources. Thus, resource allocation will improve.
Possible uses of commodity derivative markets by the private sector can be
illustrated by the following examples. An exporter has bought coffee from farmers but
has yet to sell it to a foreign buyer and is therefore exposed to price uncertainty. If prices
decline his profits will be negatively affected. How can he protect himself? At the time of
purchase he can sell a futures contract, then buy back the contract when the coffee is sold
to a foreign buyer. If prices have declined between time of purchase and the time of sale,
the exporter will receive a lower price for the coffee, but this lower price will be
compensated by the profits in the futures market (he sold futures at higher price than he
bought). The opposite will be true if prices increase. Thus, in the end the exporter's
realized price will be very close linked to the price of the futures contract he sold when he
purchased coffee from the farmers. Thus, price uncertainty is largely removed from the
exporter's transaction.
If the exporter wanted to ensure a minimum price, instead of a futures contract he
could have purchased a put option. If prices decline the exporter will exercise the option
and be compensated for the lower price at which he sold the coffee. If prices increase the
exporter will not exercise the option and all profits from the higher price will accrue to
the exporter. However, options require the payment of a premium, (futures do not) which
could be costly at times. On the other hand, the purchase of an option does not require
margins (something that futures do) which may be easier for the exporter from a cash
flow point of view.
Hedging in this way is very important for agricultural commodities because
harvesting takes place in few months while selling takes place throughout the year. The
use of derivative markets by local traders is therefore necessary to reduce price
uncertainty related to holding inventories, and to give traders flexibility with regard to
buying and selling. If he cannot find a buyer or seller, the trader can sell or buy futures
contracts to lock in a price; then, when he sells or buys the physical commodity he can
buy or sell the futures contract. As in the previous example, gains (losses) from the
futures transaction will compensate for losses (gains) from the physical transaction.
15Traders can use a large number of strategies involving derivatives and use several
derivative instruments to reduce their exposure to price risks. The choice of strategy or
instruments depends on the type of price uncertainty the trader faces and the cost and
benefits of each.
Canfarmers  use derivative markets? Commodity derivative markets are based
on large volumes handled by exporters, large local traders, importers and large local
processors. Unless farmers have large commercial farms, they usually do not use
derivative markets directly. This is because they lack the volume necessary to sell a
futures contract, the infrastructure necessary to access derivative markets (hardware,
internal systems, know-how, etc.), and the capital required for such transactions. In
contrast, metals and oil producing companies, whether private or public, usually tend to
operate directly in the derivative markets because they typically market their own product
and operate in large volumes.
However, farmers can use derivative markets indirectly through intermediaries,
without negating any of the benefits of these markets. The key issue regarding
intermediation is whether a third party can perform the function more efficiently; that is,
at the lower cost. The use of commodity derivative markets requires adequate lines of
credit, know-how, infrastructure, and market information. In the grain market, for
example, a grain elevator company may offer to buy grain from farmers at a fixed or
minimum guaranteed price. The company can then use the derivative market to hedge the
assumed price exposure (a simple strategy would be to sell futures contracts or buy a put
option). Farmer associations or cooperatives can also act as intermediaries to manage
price risk for their members; by using commodity derivative markets the associations can
offer minimum price guarantees to their members. For example, FEDECOOP, the apex
organization of coffee cooperatives in Costa Rica, is using commodity derivative markets
to hedge the coffee farmers' price risk.
Also in Costa Rica, coffee farmers receive a first payment from the millers when
they deliver their coffee, and subsequent payments throughout the crop year as millers
sell the coffee to exporters. Because millers cannot recover money from the farmers in
case coffee prices fall below the first payment, and given the high volatility of coffee
prices, millers are only willing to advance about half the expected price as an initial
payment. Thus millers offer a minimum price guarantee (an option) to the farmers.
However, several millers have managed to advance more than three quarters of the
expected price by purchasing put options to insure themselves against declines in coffee
prices. The cost of the option is deducted from the payment to the farmer. Millers that
offer this option to farmers have attracted business since farmers like the price protection.
Thus when farmers access commodity derivative markets indirectly, an exporter, trader,
or farmer association can absorb (or aggregate) the price risk from many smallholders and
hedge the exposure in the derivative markets.
Another example, Central Soya, a grain processing company in Poland, has
introduced a risk management instrument for local producers. Central Soya agrees to
16purchase grains, but producers can opt to fix (call in) their price and receive payment at
some future date. Central Soya guarantees that they will receive a price no lower than the
price on the day of delivery. In that sense, the Central Soya contract works as a put
option. By delivering and not fixing their price, producers can take advantage of the
increase in price later in the season (they can spread their sales), and also have price
protection: prices cannot drop below those on the day of delivery. Without this system
producers would need either to sell at harvest, when prices are usually at a seasonal low,
or store and sell later, thus incurring storage costs. For Central Soya, the delay in
payment means savings in the cost of financing its purchases. Producers, for their part,
can use the Central Soya contract to obtain financing from banks.
Governments can also intermediate for small farmers. For example, in Mexico,
the government is offering a guaranteed minimum price to cotton farmers and hedges its
exposure by purchasing put options on the New York cotton exchange.
Governments can also benefit by using derivative markets in government
sponsored commodity programs. Governments are being forced to examine new
approaches to providing income and price support to producers of agricultural
commodities. This trend is being driven by attempts to rein in government expenses, the
desire of producers to have friendlier and more flexible support mechanisms, and the
requirement to comply with international trade agreements. Governments are also trying
to ensure that new approaches maintain suitable safety nets for producers but without
interfering with market forces.
In this context, commodity derivative instruments such as futures, options on
futures, swaps and commodity bonds are being examined and tested to determine their
viability to provide a suitable level of price protection and income stabilization that is
cost effective and trade neutral. The use of financial markets is attractive to producers,
market participants and program administrators because, compared to government price
stabilization programs, this approach is considered to:
*  be less expensive to manage and operate.
*  be consistent with GATT,
*  provide producers with benefits comparable to traditional programs, and
*  be market neutral because premiums are established in open markets.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Agriculture and Agri-Food
Canada (AAFC) have implemented pilot projects that use commodity-derivative based
instruments to provide participating producers with an alternative to traditional farm
income support programs. The USDA program provides participants with option on
futures contracts and small subsidies to cover brokerage commissions. The program is
available to a small subset of regular feedgrain and wheat program participants.
17The options pilot project in Canada differs substantially from the USDA program.
It provides all cattle producers with market access to a specialized put option, comprised
of Canadian dollar-converted US live cattle futures. The put option is roughly one-fifth
the size of the regular futures contract in Chicago (annex 2).
The USDA pilot was initiated in the 1990 Farm Bill and the Canadian pilot was
approved in 1994 following the cessation of the National Tripartite Stabilization Program
(NTSP) for live cattle. The USDA pilot project has been active for the past several crop
years and participation has been large. The Canadian pilot began in May 1995.
These pilot projects are examples of how governments are using financial
instruments to provide risk management mechanisms for producers. Other governments
are using financial instruments to re-insure their own risk directly. For example, the
Mexican government has used financial instruments to manage their commodity price
exposure in offering price protection to cotton growers (box 4). Also in Mexico, before
the devaluation of 1994, the government used commodity derivative markets to lock in
the amount of subsidies to corn farmers. The government had set a farmgate price of 750
pesos per ton and was compensating local millers for the difference between the fixed
farmgate price and the international (US) price for corn at their factory gate, which was
below the fixed farmgate price. If the US price were to drop, under this arrangement the
government would have to pay more money. Because of this uncertainty, the government
set up a swap with a leading international brokerage firm that would fix a priori the
amount of money required to support the fixed corn prices. In several other countries,
government organizations utilize financial instruments to offset foreign exchange and
interest rate risk.
In general, there is an inverse relationship between commodity prices and the
level of government expenditures. In the US for example, if corn prices decline,
government deficiency payments to producers will rise. To the extent that policies are
income oriented, a similar inverse relationship exists between the actual profit margin of
a producer and government outlays. This has generally been the case in government
support programs to Canadian livestock producers. In either event, the outcome of many
farm income and price support programs is directly related to a market action. To the
extent that there is a financial market corresponding to the government program
mechanism, such as corn or livestock futures, there is the possibility of using a financial
instrument to counter or reinsure the market based risk to producers.
The success or failure of the USDA and Canadian pilot projects has yet to be
determined. However, clear lessons can be learned by better understanding their goals,
objectives, functions and features.
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19Traditional farm programs have provided participating producers with largely
predetermined prices and, to a certain extent, farm income. The "price" to producers of
these guarantees is determined by a combination of administrative decisions, such as
acreage set-asides; and market factors. However, the level of producer support is typically
known in advance. Often these programs are accused of interfering with competitive
markets and distorting trade. Traditional programs have been expensive to manage and
operate. Table 3 summarizes the similarities and differences between traditional
commodity programs and derivative-based approaches.
Table 3. Comparison of Commodity Program Approaches
Traditional Program  Derivative Instrument
Approach
Producer flexibility  none  very much
Income/price support  extensive  adequate
Trade distortion  questionable/significant  none
Support established  administratively  market-based
Government cost (and/or  considerable  minor
consumer cost)  none
Producer cost  none  some
Empirical evidence supports the use of commodity derivative instruments as
efficient and effective commodity price risk management tools. Traditional futures
markets have offered a limited number of instruments directly related to crop and
livestock production. But now that agriculture has become more sophisticated, with a
larger number of commercial crops and agricultural products being produced and traded
in greater quantities, more sophisticated instruments are available. These are now
possible because of increased linkages among agricultural markets worldwide as a result
of economies'  liberalization. Domestic and international prices are now linked, making
the use of derivative instruments more accessible to developing country governments and
to the private sector. Commodity brokerage houses and banks are also becoming more
sophisticated in providing alternative products in the global market place.
Since many government farm income and price support programs are now directly
related to  the futures  and options  markets,  the use of market-based risk  management
alternatives by governments is generally considered a transitory step.  In most of these
government price support programs, the government's  intention is to allow the private
sector to  develop price  hedging instruments, with  the government  remaining involved
only until such private sector alternatives develop. Thus, the sequence is from traditional
government  farm  price  support  programs,  to  programs  where  the  government  uses
market-based hedging tools,  to the evolution  of the private sector in directly  hedging
agricultural price risks.
20Other than hedging their exposure from offering price protection, governments
can also benefit from using commodity derivative markets when their revenues and/or
expenses depend on commodities. This can be, for example, through export taxation, or
even indirectly through income and expenditure taxes. Governments may also be
concerned about the unpredictability of their foreign exchange revenues. Commodity risk
management has the potential of simplifying governments' budgetary planning,
improving budgetary control, and avoiding the need for crisis management as a result of
unforeseen revenue shortfalls. An example of these benefits is the case of Mexico during
the Gulf War. In late 1990 and early 1991, the Mexican governrment  used commodity
derivative instruments to protect its crude oil export earnings against a price drop.
Mexico's hedging strategy ensured that it received at least $17 per barrel, the price used
as the basis for its 1991 budget. Its participation in commodity derivative markets
reassured investors that regardless of oil price movements, the economic program and the
budget would be sustained.
217. Risk Management  Tools Can Facilitate Credit Flows and Trade Finance
For many developing countries, commodity markets provide the strongest link to
the global economy. In these countries, commodity exports provide not only most of the
export earnings, but also a conduit for financial flows. Since developing countries
generate small amounts of domestic capital via savings, such external capital flows are
essential to economic growth. For countries in transition and for recently liberalized
commodity subsectors, the quick establishment of credit flows is crucial to the success of
reform. This section describes how commodity risk management tools can and have been
combined with traditional financial tools to enhance credit flows.
The question of who will finance crop exports is crucial for countries
contemplating the removal of government commodity marketing boards. In many cases,
single-channel marketing structures have been in place for decades, supplanting market-
based institutions and financing arrangements. In fact, in some cases, it is the financial
failings of the old system that precipitated reform. For example, a financial crisis among
the cashew marketing cooperatives in Tanzania in 1991 led to the dismantling of that
country's  single-channel marketing system and the introduction of private trade.
One of the simplest trade finance arrangements is export prefinancing. Because
this type of arrangement requires minimal institutional infrastructure, it becomes a
convenient method of crop financing following marketing reforms. For example, most of
the cashew and cotton crops in Tanzania are prefinanced, as well as most of the coffee
trade from Uganda. In the most straightforward version of prefinancing, an offshore
buyer identifies a local counterpart and contracts the purchase of a fixed quantity-for
example, 100 tons of coffee. Using an observable forward price-for  example, the
London robusta market-the  buyer and his local counterpart agree on a fixed price for the
specified quantity, which includes a financing charge. The offshore buyer then provides a
limited line of credit to his local counterpart, which is drawn down as the local crop is
purchased. The debt owed by the local counterpart to the offshore buyer is then canceled
when the commodity is delivered to the offshore buyer. The loan is frequently
denominated in dollars and the credit is exchanged for local currency only as required,
minimizing the risk associated with currency fluctuations. Further, the offshore buyer
may have already sold the commodity forward to minimize his own price risk.
Prefinancing arrangements have been essential to the success of commodity
subsector reforms in Uganda, Tanzania and other countries. Smallholder farmers have
benefited greatly, receiving prompt payment and a much greater share of the export price
than under the premarket liberalization system (the Ugandan coffee reforms, box 5).
However, such loans are unsecured and entail a great deal of counterparty risk. Although
the financing charges associated with prefinancing are usually much lower than domestic
alternatives, unsecured credit can still be expensive, encouraging local buyers to turn over
their working capital quickly and limiting their ability to shop price. For example, such
arrangements are turned over in as little as six working days for coffee in Uganda. In
22addition, this method of finance is not readily available to all market participants, since it
is based on personal relationships.
An alternative method, warehouse-receipt financing,  provides a method of
collateralizing the crop to lower risk to the lender and thereby lower finance charges to
the borrower. To work well, this method requires that the receipt have a recognized basis
in law so that the ownership established by the receipt is not readily challenged. After
placing his commodity in a bonded and insured warehouse, the local owner is issued a
transferable receipt which declares the weight and quality of his stored goods. The receipt
can be used as collateral when borrowing from banks or from the warehouse itself. The
financial institution is assured of the quality and quantity of the collateral by the
warehouse, but still faces fluctuations in the value of the collateral. As a result, the
financial institution will only lend a percentage of the value of the stored good-
frequently 60-70 percent-but  at rates much more favorable than unsecured lines of
credit. However, when the owner combines the warehouse receipt with aput option, the
financial institution can establish a floor for the price of the commodity, thereby
guaranteeing the value of the collateral. The PTA Bank, a regional development bank in
Kenya, uses a similar scheme to finance commodity trade in East Africa.
Another useful risk management tool for commodity financing is forward sales.
The forward markets generally evolve to facilitate processing. For example, an edible oil
refiner may well want to purchase crude palm oil and simultaneously sell the palm oil
olein and stearin (end products of the processing) forward, guaranteeing a profit from the
processing. Sometimes the local markets are established informally through telephone
communications (for example, in the Indonesian palm oil market) and sometimes through
more formal exchanges, such as the forward maize contract offered by the Zimbabwe
Agricultural Commodity Exchange.
For some markets, such as petroleum, gold, copper and sugar, there are liquid
forward markets spanning two or more years. Firms can use forward sales to lock in
profits and thereby enhance their creditworthiness. For example, exporters in Thailand
have entered into three and four year fixed price agreements which guarantee margins
above production costs. Based on such forward contracts, Asian banks have been willing
to lend to the firms at favorable rates.
A slightly more sophisticated approach was taken by Pemex, Mexico's  national
oil company in 1993 (UNCTAD 1995). Pemex created the Pemex Receivables US
Masters Trust, which raised capital through certificates issued to large private investors.
Payments from the trust against the certificates were secured in part by agreements
pledging the proceeds from forward sales to a number of American oil companies in the
trust.
Forward sales require an explicit agreement by one partner to sell and another
party to purchase a fixed amount of a certain commodity with an agreed-upon pricing
arrangement. Another mechanism, commodity bondfinancing,  uses future production to
23finance current investments. One example of this type of financing is the Ashanti Gold
Corporation in Ghana. In partnership with the IFC, Ashanti issued bonds to raise $140
million in 1992 to construct a new sulfide treatment plant. The loan can be drawn in
either dollars or gold. It carries a variable interest rate linked to the London Gold Lease
Rate. If the loan is drawn in gold, the payment schedule is payable in the dollar
equivalents of the gold amounts. As a result, the payment schedule can be linked to the
proceeds of future production-regardless  of the future value of the gold. In turn, bond
holders who would prefer fixed dollar returns to their loan can hedge the value of that
future payment.
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In  CD -IW  :￿n8  Overcoming Some of the Barriers for  Using Commodity Derivatives
Although the use of derivative markets provide an attractive alternative for both
government and the private sector in developing countries to manage their commodity
price risks, they still are not widely used. So why do only some countries attempt to
manage their commodity price risk using commodity derivative markets? Because
developing countries face certain barriers. The most important are described below.
Legal and regulatory barriers
Many developing countries have exchange controls which prevents users from
having access to foreign exchange to settle initial and variation margins for the use of
futures contracts or pay premiums (and margins if necessary) for options. Other
developing countries have laws prohibiting access to international futures markets
completely. Colombia, for example, prohibited the use of external risk management
instruments until the early 1  990s. Only after the Colombian government changed the
legal framework was the private sector allowed to hedge price risks using commodity
derivative markets.
Policy barriers and government intervention
Various parties in a developing country are often exposed to external price risks
due to complex and nontransparent institutional arrangements, market failures or (policy-
induced) distortions or regulations. Consequently, there may be fewer incentives for any
party to engage in risk management. Particularly since the majority of risks will either fall
on the small producers and consumers, who do not possess the means to manage them
effectively, or be absorbed by the government budget. Government organizations that
face a "soft" budget constraint also little incentive to manage commodity price risks.
In some developing countries, government intervention may greatly diminish the
price risk incurred by the private sector and thus reduce the incentive for the sector to
manage risk. This may happen through explicit or implicit guarantees such as price
stabilization schemes, bank deposit insurance schemes, guaranteed exchange rate
coverage, etc. In some circumstances, the tax system may present a deterrent against
hedging, since net profits may be less exposed to external price risks than gross profits.
Because private companies are only interested in hedging net profits, they will have less
incentive to hedge (implying that tax revenues, the difference between gross and net
profits, are exposed to price risk). Some specific examples are below.
In Brazil, prior to reform movements in many domestic commodity prices
differed from international prices, leading to difficulties in using internationally traded
derivative instruments for hedging. Domestic prices differed from international prices not
because of differences in grades of the commodity, etc., but because of government
intervention in the spot (cash) market and other policy-induced distortions. In response,
trading company subsidiaries of commercial banks issued short-term certificates of
26deposit linked to domestic commodity prices. As a result, a domestic hedging (futures)
contract was created, and some risk reduction was achieved. In principle, however, the
use of international commodity derivative markets would have been preferable.
A similar situation existed until the late 1980s in Argentina, where the grain
sector was burdened by high levels of direct and indirect taxation, an expensive
marketing system, and other government regulation. As a result, domestic prices were not
related systematically to world prices. The liberalization of the Argentine grain sector,
including the abolition of the National Grain Board (which acted as regulator as well as
trader), should do much to bring domestic prices in line with international prices, and in
that way allow greater use of international hedging instruments.
Currently in Croatia, government intervention in purchasing, storing and
disposing of wheat surpluses causes domestic wheat prices to deviate from international
wheat prices. As a result, private traders, even if they want to, cannot use internationally
traded wheat futures and options contracts to hedge their price risk. A similar situation
also exists for the grain markets in Poland and Turkey.
In Colombia, one of the major reasons private exporters have no incentive to
hedge for longer periods is that export contracts are "opened" by the institution
supervising coffee exports for no more than three months. As a consequence, the fees to
be paid for exports three months ahead remain uncertain and, in effect, represent a larger
risk to the private exporter than international coffee price risks. Even though there is an
international hedging market with a longer horizon and with little basis risk, exporters do
not use it and, in the end, small producers end up absorbing the price risk.
These examples make it clear that the measurement of exposure and the need for
hedging should not just be evaluated for the country as a whole, but should take into
account the risks borne by various entities within the country the marketing boards,
farmers, cooperatives and private export and import companies. The distribution of risks
and the interdependencies among risk bearers depend on the institutional structure in
commodity production, processing, marketing and distribution. Hence, the design of a
coherent hedging strategy can be a complex undertaking which needs to balance the
concerns of all participants in both the public and private sectors.
Knowhow
Risk management activities require considerable knowledge of financial
instruments and an appropriate institutional framework within which to carry out hedging
operations. Expertise is required to understand the risk structure of the company or
economy, identify appropriate risk management instruments and engage in and supervise
hedging transactions. Unfortunately, many developing countries lack the expertise for
these operations. Furthermore, an institutional framework may be necessary to introduce
adequate reporting, recording, monitoring and evaluating mechanisms, and to establish
internal control procedures that can protect against speculative transactions and execution
27errors. Box 6 presents some basic steps that companies can follow in setting up a
successful institutional framework to manage their price risks.
The recent cases of Codelco (a copper producer in Chile), MG Corp. (a unit of
Germany's  Metallgesellschaft AG), Procter and Gamble Co.. Orange Country in
California, Sumitomo, and Barings Bank have shown that the lack of internal controls
and systems to monitor the exposure from using derivative markets can result in very
serious losses. These examples show that the lack of internal control procedures a
problem not only among developing countries but in industrial countries as well. The
problem is much more serious for developing countries that have weaker administrative
capabilities
Awareness
Another important barrier to using these market instruments is a general lack of
familiarity with their strategic uses, and a misconception that hedging is the same as
speculation. Many policymakers expect, for example, that risk management will lead to
consistently higher profits, lower debt service payments, higher export prices or.
conversely, lower import prices. However, risk management involves a tradeoff between
the assurance of predictable costs against future uncertain external price movements,
which could produce either large windfalls or equally large losses. How risk management
affects losses or gains to the economy depends on the (ex post) trend in prices, which
cannot be anticipated.
The fact that policymakers are unaware of the costs of risk management-in  terms
of foregone higher revenues-can  lead to successful hedging programs being perceived
as failures, or can prevent potential attractive hedging programs from getting started.
Political backlash has occurred when transactions turned out unfavorable ex post. For
example, when Brazil and Chile locked in crude oil import prices during the 1990 Gulf
War, these prices were considered high ex post, since crude oil prices declined after the
end of the war in 1991. In this respect, options, in spite of their "speculative" payoff
profile, can have advantages over other types of risk management tools such as lock-in
instruments. They are an insurance instrument that provides protection against adverse
price movements. At most, the premium is lost; thus the use of options may cause less
political backlash than locking in a fixed price.
Barriers related to technology
Critical preconditions needed for effective use of risk management instruments
may not always be in place in developing countries. Technical factors such as transport,
storage, time differences, data processing and, especially, communications bottlenecks
can represent barriers.
28Box 6X  Avoiding  Failures  in Derivative  Markets
To avoid failures,  companies  need  to properly  control  and aggressively  manage.the  risks
associated  with derivative  instruments  by creating  a strong  risk management
infrastructure.  A strong  infrastructure  will not only facilitate  the effective  control  and
management  of these sophisticated  instruments,  but will also clearly.outline  set of
strategic  objectives  for using  these instruments.  A risk management  infrastructure  allows
the tracking  of all derivatives  that  have been  executed.  It also entails  agreement  within
the institution  on an overall risk strategy,  a definition  of priorities,  and a conceptual
framevwork  for managing  risks  that fits into the company's commercial  strategy.  Somre
steps that.  companies  can take to set up a successful  institutional  framework  to manage
their commodity  price risks are:
Defie  your company's  commodity  price exposure.  Understand  the commodity  price.
risks that your company  is facing.  Quantify  the impact  of price changes  on your
company's cash flow  and balance  sheet  to give  you an idea  about the cost of not hedging.
Define  your company's risk tolerance.
Formulate  a clear  strategy.  Look into ways to deal with your company's price
exposure,  including  the altern.ative  of not hedging  at all. Understand  that while  hedging 
may involve  some  risks and costs, not hedging  may be riskier  and costlier.  Before
choosing  a hedging strategy,  it is important  to quantify the costs and benefits  of different
hedging  strategies.  Prior to selecting  a strategy,  there should  be a clear understand  .inig  of.
how the performance  (the success  or failure)  of hedges  should  be measured.
Explain  the purpose  of hedging  anid  hedging  strategies.  Everyone  who  needs to
understand  the hedging  strategy  and its cost and benefits  must be informed4  Efforts  to
educate  and raise  awareness  on this issue within your company,are  very important.
Select brokers  carefully.  Ensure that.the  brokers  have the expertise  and,the  products
your company  requires  and that you understand  very clearly  the costs (including
opportunity  costs) and benefits  associated  with the products  they  offer.  It is also
important  to distinguish  between  financial  advisory  and brokerage  services.
Monitor positions  regularly  and develop  appropriate  controls.  Ensure that  .no
unauthorized  trades  are executed and  that errors  are detected  early,  set exposure  limits,
and monitor  your positions  frequently  (preferably  daily).  Also,  develop  procedures  to
respond  to possible  emergencies.  When  setting  up monitoring  and control  systems  it is
important  to have a clear separation  between  the execution  and the monitoring  control  of
trades.
29Basis risk and liquidity
Arguably, the lack of hedging by developing countries arises in part because the
international markets for commodity risk management are incomplete from the point of
view of many exporters or importers. There is often no perfectly matching hedging tool
available for a particular commodity (e.g., tropical fruits), or there is a considerable
mismatch between the characteristics of the commodity to be hedged and those of the
commodity on which the hedging tool is based. The imperfect correlation between spot
prices and futures prices for a commodity is called basis risk. The existence of basis risk
does not necessarily imply that the other, more traditional risk management tools are
preferable-nor  that a country should establish a domestic futures exchange. But it does
require an analysis of the causes, nature and magnitude of the mismatch.
The mismatch may be with respect to maturity or type of instrument. Maturities
are generally limited to one to two years in the futures and options markets; long-dated,
over-the-counter derivative instruments are often not available for the commodity in
question. While the short-dated hedge might, in principle, be rolled over (i.e., renewed at
maturity), so as to duplicate a long-dated hedge, in practice the protection offered by a
rollover will be considerably less than that of a long-dated instrument because of basis
risk arising from changes in the relationship between spot and futures prices. While using
these short-dated instruments may significantly reduce the short-term exposure of many
countries to price risk, hedging for longer periods with short-dated instruments is far from
perfect.
In addition to maturity mismatch, basis risk also arises from the differences in
characteristics of the commodity to be hedged and the hedging instrument. This is the risk
that over a given period of time the price of the commodity to be hedged will not move in
lockstep with the price of the commodity on which the hedging instrument is based. The
reason for this can be the existence of many grades of a commodity (e.g., different grades
of crude oil) and only a limited number of liquidly traded hedging tools.
Research has shown that for many commodities, both sources of basis risk could
be relatively small. For example, in simulations of hedging crude oil exports or imports,
it was found that by using short-dated futures (less than six months maturity), about 75
percent to 85 percent of the short-term price risk could be eliminated over the period
1985-1990 for most crude oils, implying basis risk of only 15 percent to 25 percent. This
level of basis risk is not high, considering the large variety of crude oils we used (the API
varied from 250 to 400). Using longer-dated futures for hedging oil prices, the other form
of basis risk became more important, but again, not by much: at least 70 percent of the
price risk in excess of six-month horizons could be eliminated for most crude oils
(Claessens and Varangis 1994 and 1995).
Similar results were found for coffee. In the cases of Costa Rican and Colombian
coffee, for example, the basis risk using New York coffee futures contracts for nearterm
hedges was found to be relatively low. measuring 6 percent and 13 percent respectively.
For cotton, results suggest that despite the existence of relative high basis risk between
30prices of varieties from developing countries and New York cotton futures contract
prices, hedging reduces price risk by 30 percent to 70 percent (Satyanarayan and others
1995). Basis risk in cotton was smaller among countries with little government
intervention in the cotton sector, such as Argentina, Mexico, and Peru, and higher for
countries with higher intervention, such as Turkey.
Basis risk as well as liquidity will remain the important issue for all types of
commodity risk management instruments. While for the three commodities analyzed (and
many others), basis risk need not be a serious constraint to using existing (external)
futures markets, we cannot expect that the markets for commodity risk management
instruments will develop sufficiently for all commodities. On the short end of the hedging
spectrum, the introduction of new instruments-which  would reduce basis risk problems
for a group of consumers or producers-will  be constrained by inadequate liquidity.
Constraints are more severe at the longer end. For example, longer-term swaps
and other long-term risk management instruments for agricultural crops such as coffee,
cocoa and cotton are inherently more problematic, in part because of uncertainty in the
production of agricultural commodities. The development of markets for long-dated
instruments for these commodities can thus be expected to take some time, and in the
meantime rolling over short-term hedges will lead to higher basis risks.
Creditworthiness
Because some developing countries have low credit ratings, commercial banks
and brokerage houses have shied away from dealing with governments and private firms
in these countries. Forward, swaps and options (if sold) contracts require high credit
ratings (they are credit intensive). The longer the maturity and the greater the volatility in
the commodity price, the higher the credit risk. As long as some developing countries
have low credit ratings, their access to longer-dated commodity derivative instruments
will be severely constrained. Short-dated, exchange-traded futures and options, which are
subject to margin requirements, can help overcome the credit risk. But margins can create
a cash flow problem. Options, regardless of maturity and whether bought on an exchange
or over the counter, carry no credit risk for the developing country.
Forward, swap, and option (if sold) contracts involve a consideration of the
counterparty's creditworthiness, however. The longer the performance period (the length
of the contract) and the greater the volatility of the underlying price, the greater the credit
risk. Since many developing countries lack sufficient credit standing, their access to long-
dated risk management instruments will be limited. Most market participants are, for
example, reluctant to offer entities in even the most creditworthy developing countries
swap contracts which extend beyond one year.
But there are encouraging signs. Private borrowers in several developing countries
now have better access to foreign finance, although in some cases borrowers they are
required to put up collateral or other forms of security such as pledges of future
receivables. Private entities in some developing countries are now also using short-dated
31swaps for hedging purposes. For instance, in Chile, Mexico, and Papua New Guinea,
export financing is combined regularly with commodity swaps. The commodity swaps
form part of a hedging package by providing price assurance for future export earnings.
For added security, the proceeds from exports could be deposited at an escrow account
abroad and returned to the country after the lenders are paid off. This has been, for
example, the case of Mexicana de Cobre, a Mexican copper producer that received a loan
from a syndicate of banks headed by Paribas on the condition that it use a swap to hedge
its copper export revenues.
In Chile, an intermediary in the copper industry, ENAMI, offers its customers
(producers) the possibility of guaranteeing a minimum price for their copper exports, in
exchange for which the producers agree to share to a lesser extent in upward price
movements. ENAMI covers this guarantee through a series of options and futures
transactions in the international markets. Risk management is important for these
producers since their marginal costs of production are quite high. Performance (credit)
risk on the part of the private producers is minimal for ENAMI, since it has a natural
monopoly on producers products, while as a semi-state entity, it has good credit standing
abroad.
Premiums and cash flow problems
The upfront costs of some risk management instruments can be a barrier for
countries that already have problems raising foreign funds. Purchases of put options (for
protection against lower prices) and call options (for protections against price rises),
require a significant upfront premium, usually a significant portion of the value of the
asset to be hedged. The cost of the option will depend on (i) the extent to which the
option is out of the money (i.e., the exercise price of the option is beneath the prevailing
futures price); (ii) the term of the option; and (iii) the volatility of the underlying
commodity futures price. At "normal" levels of volatility and for six month options a few
cents out of the money, prices are usually around 3 percent of the underlying futures
prices (or the value of the asset to be hedged). However, hedgers can lower the cost of
price protection by using futures and some collars (buying a call (buyer of commodities)
or put (seller of commodities) and selling a put (buyer) or a call (seller)).
In addition, purchasing/selling futures and selling options requires the deposit of
an initiation and variation margins. The cash flow implications of margin calls on futures
(and short option) positions can be an important problem. Maintaining margin calls
requires daily funds, depending on the daily fluctuations of the commodity price that is
hedged. Daily margin calls can also be a serious constraint because foreign exchange is
not always readily available for entities in developing countries. However, it should be
noted that margin calls do not represent a cost; the negative cash flow effect of margin
calls is offset by higher (for a buyer) or lower (for a seller) commodity prices.
329.  Establishing  Commodity  Derivative  Markets  in  Developing  Countries  versus
Using Existing Markets.
Why establish a futures market?
The  desire  of  some  developing  countries  to  set  their  own  commodity
futures/options exchanges (CFOE) is related to three factors; (i) their desire to improve
the price discovery process in their country and obtain more meaningful forward prices;
(ii) the notion that if a particular commodity accounts for a large portion of a country's
economic activity, then it should also be priced in that country's own marketplace; and
(iii) the benefit of lower basis risk (for some commodities, no futures contracts exist at
all). In addition, many developing countries considered a CFOE the logical next step after
the  development  of  stock  and  financial  markets.  CFOEs  already  exist  in  several
developing  countries  and  transition  economies  including  Argentina  (grains  and
livestock),  Brazil  (livestock,  coffee,  cotton  and  gold).  China  (various  metals  and
agricultural commodities), Hungary (grains and hogs), India (pepper), Malaysia (palm oil,
tin and cocoa), the Philippines (copra, sugar, coffee, soybeans and dry cocoon), Russia
(metals), and Zimbabwe (corn and beans). Some of these countries, such as Argentina
and  India, have a  long tradition  in futures  markets that  was interrupted by excessive
government intervention.
The two most important functions performed by futures markets are to facilitate
the  management  of  risk  and  to  establish  forward  prices.  Forward  prices  provide
information to decisionmakers, which can lead to more efficient allocation of resources.
Forward cash contracts, or forward contracts, often proceed the development of futures
contracts.  Forward as  well  as  futures  markets  developed  from  well-functioning  cash
(spot) markets and added the time dimension. Forward and futures markets often exist
side-by-side and complement each other,
Futures  and  forward  contracts,  however,  perform  different  roles.  Forward
contracts are usually not fungible (i.e., liquid) because they are tailored to the particular
market circumstances  and  transfer of the  contract requires that  the credit  risk  of the
counterparty be  evaluated. Futures contracts are standardized and traded  on organized
exchanges; and since no credit risk is involved, contracts of the same maturity are perfect
substitute for each other. Hedgers and speculators are attracted to futures markets because
futures contracts provide them with  liquid, standardized financial instruments to assist
them in the management of risks. Portfolio managers use the specific relations between
individual  futures  prices  and  returns  on  other  financial  instruments  to  choose  the
composition of their instruments.
Conditions for establishing a domestic futures market
The  most  basic precondition  for  establishing  a  domestic  futures  market  is  a
competitive, well-functioning spot (cash) market  with  transparent prices. This  implies
that the spot market should not be monopolized by either private firms or public entities.
Additional  conditions  include  a  well-functioning  infrastructure  for  product  grading,
distribution, transportation and storage. Also required are a legal structure and system of
33property rights and enforceable contracts that can enforce repayment rules and provisions
for liquidation in cases of bankruptcy. Traders must be knowledgeable about the concept
of ownership and be aware of the associated risk. There must also be a stable and credible
currency, reliable credit markets, and financial institutions willing to participate in these
markets.
Following these basic conditions is a set of conditions related to futures trading
itself. There must be a sufficient number of traders, speculators and financial institutions
interested  in  a  futures  exchange.  A  country  cannot  depend  only  on  producers  and
consumers to achieve a viable futures markets. The involvement of foreign firms is also
necessary to achieve an external diversification of risk.
Rules  for trading, and  procedures for resolving  disputes and  conflicts  and  for
preventing price manipulation need to be established. It is critical to establish a clearing
house  with sufficient financial resources to  act as an  intermediary in all trades and to
serve as a generator of all transactions. A well-functioning clearing house establishes the
financial integrity of the futures market; without it, traders will not have the confidence to
use the market.
While these conditions are the basis for a futures exchange, however, they cannot
determine whether a particular futures contract will be successful. The main conditions
for a successful futures contract can be summarized as follows: First, commodity price
and futures prices must be closely correlated. Second, the underlying commodity must be
standardized in terms of size, grade or quality, place of delivery and month of maturity so
that contracts become fungible and homogeneous. For agricultural commodities a grading
system allows a wide variety of commodities to be included in the contract by applying
necessary discounts and  premia to the representative price. Third, for a contract to be
effective as a  hedging instrument, the cash price for each of the varieties needs to  be
closely correlated with the futures price.
The detailed specifications of the futures contract must reflect the activities and
traditions  of the spot market.  These conditions  are broad  in nature and by  no means
guarantee the success of  a  futures contract, as  measured by the trading  volume (i.e.,
liquidity). Empirical findings suggest that the success of a futures contract also depends
on the price variability  of the commodity in question, the size of the cash market, the
presence of an efficient cross hedge (or alternative contract to hedge) for the underlying
commodity, and the contract design features.
Benefits in establishing a domestic futures markets
The two main benefits in establishing a domestic  futures market are improved
price discovery and reduced basis risk. Domestic futures markets may have less basis risk
because the futures contract represents more closely the local cash commodity. Delivery
at a nearby location will also reduce basis risk. As stated at the beginning of this section,
other  important  benefits  include:  more  publicly  available  information,  improved
transmission of price and other commodity-related information, improved credit systems,
34more responsive capital markets, uniformity in repayment rules and market surveillance,
reduced transaction costs and more accurate forward prices.
These benefits should be compared against the benefits and costs of using existing
(foreign) futures  exchanges, which  have the advantage of  being very  liquid and well
established  in  terms  of  rules  and  regulations.  Higher  liquidity  may  mean  reduced
transaction costs, which can outweigh the basis and exchange rate risks. The major risks
when using existing (foreign) futures exchanges are basis risk, as indicated earlier, and
exchange rate risk. When a country's currency is relatively stable, trading in an existing
futures exchange may be reasonable  given the higher  liquidity and  lower transactions
cost, particularly since thinly-traded domestic futures market can have higher execution
costs and higher basis risk than the combined basis and currency  risks in an existing
foreign exchange.
Major barriers to establishing domestic futures/option markets
While  the  establishment  of  a  commodity  futures  market  has  a  number  of
advantages,  conditions  in  developing  countries  make  it  hard  for  commodity  futures
exchanges to be effective. The most important barriers to establishing future exchanges in
developing countries are:
3  Lack  of  infrastructure  in  areas  such  as  in  communications,  transportation  and
information processing;
3  Underdeveloped commercial and financial sectors;
3  Government controls over commodities most likely to be traded on a futures market;
3  Government regulations restricting the use of futures/options markets and/or the free
flow of funds necessary to trade such markets;
3  Lack  of  legal  and  regulatory  framework necessary  in  establishing  futures/options
markets; and
v  Insufficient capital among potential market participants to forestall counterparty risk;
i.e. insufficient capital to form viable clearing entity.
While this list is not exhaustive, it is relatively comprehensive and represents the
experiences  of  developing  countries  in  trying  to  establish  these  markets,  as  well  as
experiences  of various  analysts who  have dealt  with  this  issue. While  these  barriers
present  real challenges  in establishing  new  futures exchanges,  they are by  no means
insurmountable obstacles.
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Types of Derivative Commodity Instruments' 2
Forward Contracts
A forward contract is an agreement to purchase or sell a given commodity at a future date
at a fixed (predetermined) price. At the day of delivery, if the actual (spot) price is higher
than the fixed price the buyer makes a profit. If the price is lower, the buyer suffers a loss.
The payoff for the seller is the opposite. In a forward contract the buyer and the seller
assume each other's performance risk (risk of nondelivery). The terms and conditions of
the forward contract are usually specific to each transaction, although some forward
contracts are standardized.
Futures Contracts
A futures contract is similar to a forward contract: the buyer (seller) of a futures contract
agrees to purchase (sell) a specified amount of a commodity at a specified price on a
specified date. But futures contracts differ significantly from forward contracts in four
ways. First, contract terms (amounts, grades, delivery dates, etc.) are generally
standardized. Second, transactions are handled only by organized exchanges through a
clearinghouse system. Third, profits and losses in trades are settled daily (marked to
market). Fourth, futures contracts require depositing a certain amount of margin money in
the exchange as collateral. Fifth, while forward contracts involve physical delivery at
maturity, futures contract are usually closed before or at maturity. Thus futures contracts
separate the physical purchase/sale of commodities from hedging. Through these
arrangements, futures contracts significantly reduce the credit and default risk entailed in
forward transactions. Liquidity (i.e., the contract volumes traded) also improves because
of the standardization of contracts.
Options Contracts
An option on a futures contract is the right-but  not the obligation-to  purchase or sell a
specified quantity of the underlying futures contract at a predetermined price on or before
a given date. Exchange-traded options, like futures contracts, are standardized. There are
also so-called over-the-counter options offered by banks and commodity brokers, which
can be customized. The purchase of an option is equivalent to price insurance; therefore,
there is a price to be paid.
Some important definitions regarding options include:
Call: A call option gives the buyer the right but not the obligation to buy the underlying
futures contract at a predeternined  price during a given period of time. Call options are
usually purchased as insurance against price increases.
Put: A put option gives the buyer the right but not the obligation to sell the underlying
futures contract at a predetermined price during a given period of time. Put options are
usually purchased as an insurance against price declines.
I This annex  was jointly  written with Eric Nadelberg,  Tropical  Trader Division,  The Chicago
Corporation.
36Strike or exercise price: The price at which the futures contract underlying an option can
be purchased (if a call) or sold (if a put). This is the predetermined price in the definition
above.
Premium. The price paid for the options contract.
Exercise: To you exercise a call (put) is to buy (sell) the underlying futures contract at the
strike price.
Time to expiration: An option is good only for the length of time specified in the contract.
The last day that an option can be exercised is called the expiration date.
Swap Contracts
A commodity swap contract is an agreement to exchange, or swap, a floating
price for a fixed price (or vice versa) for a given amount of a commodity at specific time
intervals. A commodity swap is like a series of scheduled forward contracts lined up on a
schedule, but these contracts do not involve physical deliveries of the commodity. Swaps
are not for everyone. While they solve problems relating to the need for longer-term price
fixation, they have disadvantages. They are credit intensive, and carry the risk of
nonperformance. Because swaps ultimately involve an exchange of cash against an
established pricing index, the counterparties have to feel comfortable with each other's
ability to perform on this most critical aspect of the transaction.
Swaps can be a very capital-intensive instrument if the market goes in the
direction opposite to that for which the user is taking the protection. For example, a fixed
price seller, such as a producer, will need to pay out if the market rises. A sell swap
effectively forfeits the upside of the transaction by payment to the floating price buyer of
the price difference between where the market and where his fixed price sale is. However,
the profit-limiting aspects of a swap can be remedied through the use of built in options
which can allow partial or full participation in any profits that accrue outside of the swap.
Commodity Notes
Because of the ongoing financial responsibility that is part of a swap, as well as
the potential loss of any market profits, commodity notes may be a preferred method for
providing price protection, since the budget (of the buyer of the note, i.e., producer,
exporter, government, etc.) does not forego the potential of additional profits if the
market moves in a favorable direction.
Commodity notes and swaps share some common characteristics. They can be
customized and involve no exchange of physical commodities. They also differ in some
important aspects. Commodity notes are shorter term, usually from six months to a year,
going out only as far as one year, and they are less credit intensive than swaps because
they are purchased outright by the user. Also, as opposed to a swap, a commodity note
guarantees the principle guaranteed even if the market direction is unfavorable.
37The buyer of a commodity note is paid a rate of interest directly tied to the price
of the commodity and the type of note purchased. A coffee producer government that
buys a coffee bear note as a way to provide downside price protection to a grower
receives a small interest payment, typically one percent per annum, if the market rallies,
but receives an increased rate of interest as the market moves lower. The opposite would
hold true for a buyer of a bull note, such as a processor, who receives an increased rate of
interest as the market moves higher, but suffers no loss of capital if the market moves
down. The only loss experienced by either user of the commodity note is the opportunity
loss of higher interest rates if the market does not perform to the expectations of the note
holder.
Another benefit of commodity notes is that they are an asset on the books of the
note purchaser, and in some cases, the note can be hypothecated, or used as an additional
instrument to lower borrowing costs in other areas. However attractive they may be,
however, commodity notes are not a panacea because they have to be purchased outright.
There is no leverage involved, and the fact that the notes need to be bought in $5.0
million or greater amounts puts them out of reach of smaller organizations.
Commodity-Linked Loans
In these loans, interest and/or repayment amounts are linked to the price of a
certain commodity or to an index of commodity price(s). In a popular form of
commodity-linked loans, interest and principal are paid in equal installments, the amount
of which is linked to the cash equivalent of a certain quantity of a commodity. In another
case, only the interest payments are linked to a commodity price. In any case, a
commodity-linked loan combines a conventional bank loan with a commodity swap. A
commodity-linked loan by itself, or a combined conventional bank loan and commodity
swap, will both yield the same financial results.
Commodity Inventory Purchase Agreements Linked Notes
Commodity Inventory Purchase Agreement (CIPA) linked notes are another type of
commodity linked loan. In a CIPA linked note, the transaction centers around bonded
warehouse receipts as security for the loan. Funds received for the warehouse receipts are
used to purchase a commodity-linked structured note; the principle of the note is
guaranteed, along with a minimal interest payment.
The benefit of a CIPA linked note is that the user's commodity price risk is
hedged with no premium payments. The notes are effectively financed by the inventories
in place. As a note, the borrowing is effectively turned into an earning asset since it is
backed by at least an "A" credit financial instrument, and the producer enjoys the full
participation in any market gains that might accrue as a result of positive market action.
Because the borrowing is backed by, inventory backing to the borrowing, CIPA linked
notes are less credit intensive than a swap, but like a swap, they do not interfere with
normal commercial relationships. However, because the commodity has now become an
38asset, it allows the holder of inventory to keep possession for longer than a market or crop
cycle, possibly improving his ultimate price.
Unlike some inventory-backed borrowings, however, no funds are directly given
to the note holder. Instead the funds realized by the CIPA part of the CIPA linked note
are used to purchase the note, and therefore the liquidity problems of certain borrowers
may not be solved. In a CIPA linked note, a secure bonded warehouse receipt is needed to
drive the transaction, a fact that may limit its use in certain countries that do not have
proper warehouse verification procedures in place.
Commodity Bonds
Commodity bonds can be either a forward type or an option type. In the former,
principal and/or coupons are linked to the price of a certain commodity or to an index of
commodity price(s). If only the principal payment (redemption value) is linked to a
commodity price, this bond is, in effect, a security in which a conventional bond and a
commodity forward contract are combined. If the coupon payments are also linked to a
commodity price, the bond is a combination of a conventional bond and a commodity
swap. Note that a commodity-linked loan is a combination of a conventional loan and a
commodity swap contract. The same principle is applicable to this type of commodity
bond. The forward type bonds are often issued by commodity producers for risk hedging.
The second type of commodity bond combines a conventional bond with
commodity options. In this case, a holder of the bond owns the right to buy or sell a
certain commodity at a certain exercise price in addition to a conventional bond. The
option-type bonds are often used to lower the cost of financing by attaching long-term
options written on a commodity.
Commodity linked bonds are useful for producer governments because they are
long term. But since most are for periods exceeding five years or more, and some have
been done for up to ten years in certain energy-producing nations, they are not suited for
soft commodity or grain markets, The bonds themselves can help to create secondary
financial market instruments in the issuing countries, they can assist in reducing debt
service default rates during inflationary periods because the income stream is predicated
in commodity receipts, which should rise during such periods.
The disadvantages of the commodity linked bond is that they require a fairly
sophisticated distribution network to market them. It does a government no good to issue
a bond that cannot be sold. Outside investors are needed to purchase these bonds and the
key to strong sales is the coupon rate, which is a credit-driven issue.
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The Canadian National Tripartite Stabilization Program for Live Cattle
The National Tripartite Stabilization Programs (NTSP) were developed to provide
livestock producers in Canada with a mechanism to stabilize incomes. The program was
designed to pay participants when their actual profit margin from production was below
the most recent five year average. The payment was equal to 90 to 95 percent of the
difference between the actual current margin and this five year average. The NTSP
consisted of separate cow-calf, feeder cattle, fed cattle, live hog and sheep programs.
NTSP was funded equally by producers, provincial treasuries and the federal
treasury. Because of this arrangement, the payment to producers was considered by
trading partners to be a subsidy equal to two thirds of the actual payment; consequently, it
was a major source of trade friction.
The guaranteed profit margin provided by NTSP was the equivalent of a fund
providing producer participants with a put option on their margin and charging them one
third of the actual premium. The premiums paid into the fund were designed to keep the
fund actuarially sound and were administered by a committee comprised of producers and
federal and provincial representatives. There was, however, a difference between when
payments occurred and when the funds were in a surplus situation. Consequently, the
federal government was repeatedly called on to provide financing when the funds were in
a deficit situation.
During 1992 and 1993 producer organizations and government agencies examined
alternatives to the current program. The goal was to develop a program, or programs that
were relatively neutral to the treasury, consistent with GATT, and did not interfere with
the free market. One alternative examined was the use of options based on local cash
markets.
The cattle industry in Canada was very eager to develop new support mechanisms
that would not be a source of trade friction with the US because an extensive amount of
Canadian production is exported to the United States. Consequently, research was
launched to determine if options based upon US live cattle futures could be customized to
satisfy the requirements of Canadian cattle producers.
Because there is a strong relationship between cattle prices and US-based live
cattle futures converted into Canadian dollars, the US cattle futures could have been used
by the Canadian cattle industry as a risk-hedging mechanism. However, there were a
number of complexities that prevented this from developing in the private sector in
Canada, including:
This annex  was written by Al Proulx and Tom Scott, Sparks Companies,  Inc.
40*  separate contracts would have been required for the cattle and the exchange rate
instrument;
*  there was a difference in scale between industry practices and the size of the futures
contracts; and
*  there was an absence of technical expertise in Canada for using futures to manage
commodity price risk.
These complexities were addressed through the development of derivative
instruments tailored to industry practices. For the cattle sector, the Agriculture and Agri-
Food Canada has implemented a pilot program of put options (a currency-translated
Chicago live cattle contract) written as wholesale over-the-counter-derivatives by a
Canadian financial institution. Retail delivery has been through the Canadian Federal
Farm Credit Corporation.
The cattle options pilot program (COPP) started in April 1995, and as of
December 3, 1995 has been available to cattle producers in all the significant cattle
production areas of Canada. Producers are covered in terms of underlying cattle price and
currency risk but must cover basis on their own, since this is not hedgeable from the point
of view of the put option writer. Producers are able to sell the put option back to the
writer or hold their position until expiry. Only "out-of-the-money" strikes are offered on
the four nearby contracts. The options offered are roughly one fifth the size of normal US
live cattle futures.
As part of this program, extensive training covering virtually all commercial
operations throughout the country was conducted to ensure that producers have some
knowledge of the relatively sophisticated decisions they need to make to effectively use
the put option.
Premium and strike price quotes are now carried by the two major agricultural
data services on a live basis so producers can track daily movements of premiums and
their underlying values, enabling them to make informed pricing decisions.
The instrument is being adopted relatively slowly with producers being very
careful in assessing the value of the program. The strike prices being offered reflect the
cyclical nature of the cattle industry. Both fat cattle and feeder prices have reached
cyclical lows, forcing futures prices to levels that producers do not find attractive. These
downwards trends, however, are indicative of the level of beef production expected in the
near term. Coupled with dramatic increases in feed grain prices, it has been a challenge to
provide strike prices that reflect attractive opportunities for hedging a profitable position.
41The pilot is still very much a learning experience for producers and is of serious
interest to commercial operators. who make up the greater portion of Canadian beef
production, as opposed to smaller family farm operations with herds of fewer than 100
animals.
The intent of the program is to develop a body of experience that will enable the
private sector being to offer similar programs price risk management programs on a
commercial basis. There is some evidence that packers are now considering using this
methodology in the form of a minimum price contract for physical delivery. Based on
experience to date, the federal government has made the decision to continue the (COPP)
program for 1996.
A somewhat different approach has been used for the Canadian hog industry.
Since hogs have tended to be sold through provincial marketing boards on a pooled basis,
producers have not thought in terms of price risk.
With the cooperation and startup funding of the Agriculture and Agri-Food
Canada, a minimum price hog contract (MPHC) including basis has been offered to
producers by one provincial marketing board. This contract differs from that for cattle in
that the producer must hold the contract to expiry but can get the benefit of the higher
contract or pool price at the time of marketing (physical delivery). The marketing board
absorbs any basis gain or loss but takes a margin of the strikes offered to cover its basis
exposure. The underlying put option (a currency-translated Chicago live hog contract sold
on an over the counter within stringent pricing guidelines negotiated by Sparks
Companies, Inc. on behalf of the marketing board) is written by a commercial banking
institution. The marketing board itself acts as the retail agent. This contract became
available in late October 1995. Producers have accepted the MPHC much more quickly
than their counterparts in the cattle sector.
The instrument is starting to be used commercially and it is anticipated that this
vehicle will be an integral part of a producers'  price determination. The use of a fixed
forward contract as an alternative, or on MPHC that can be converted to a fixed contract,
is also being considered to provide the full range of pricing options under the difficult
market conditions forecast for the next several years in the North American hog industry.
Since the producer-owned marketing boards are private sector operations (i.e.,
they do not receive government funding). the privatization goal of government is met
directly through the hog sector initiative. Several financial institutions in Canada are now
realizing the potential for using derivatives in the agricultural sector and are taking
initiatives of their own to position themselves for this business.
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